Existence of speculative bubbles when time-horizons are finite by Shaheen Seedat & Alexander Zimper
Economics Bulletin, 2012, Vol. 32 No. 1 pp. 251-259
1. Introduction
The possible existence of asset pricing bubbles has been studied for dividend-payment-
and trading processes characterized by time nodes f0;1;:::;Tg where the time-horizon T
is either ￿nite or in￿nite.1 Within an arbitrage pricing framework Santos and Woodford
(1997) show that￿ under fairly general conditions￿ speculative bubbles can only exist
for in￿nite time horizons (Theorem 3.1 in Santos and Woodford 1997). Within a ratio-
nal expectations equilibrium (=REE) framework in the sense of Radner (1979)￿ relevant
to the present paper￿ Tirole (1982) proves the seminal result that a myopic REE may
support bubbles if and only if the time-horizon T is in￿nite. Moreover, Tirole (1982)
also shows that any bubble must satisfy the discounted martingale property; that is, the
expected value of a bubble has to increase forever in accordance with the representative
agent￿ s time-discount factor. These technical conditions￿ the in￿nite time-horizon com-
bined with the discounted martingale property￿ are largely at odds with our perception
of real-life bubbles as pyramid schemes that are bound to burst with certainty sooner
rather than later. For example, even the most optimistic person at the height of the
latest real-estate frenzy would have agreed that real-estate prices must move back to
￿normal￿within, say, the next ten years.
In this note we investigate conditions under which an REE may support bubbles
that will burst with certainty at a ￿nite time-horizon T. To this end we consider gen-
eral trading processes characterized by arbitrary increasing sequences of time nodes
ftn j n = 0;1;:::g such that limn!1 tn = T. Trading happens in our model between
￿nitely many risk-neutral agents who share a common subjective prior about the asset￿ s
dividend-payment process. While we allow for heterogenous agents in the form of asym-
metric information, our focus on fully revealing REEs implies that all agents share the
same information at equilibrium prices. As a consequence, our approach gives rise to
a uniquely de￿ned bubble term as the di⁄erence between the equilibrium price and the
asset￿ s expected fundamental value. The expectation is thereby taken with respect to
the unique (subjective) conditional probability measure incorporating all agents￿infor-
mation revealed at equilibrium prices.
As our main formal ￿nding we establish that myopic fully revealing REEs may sup-
port bubbles if and only if maxftn j n = 0;1;:::g does not exist. This technical condition
has a straightforward economic interpretation: Even if it is common knowledge to all
agents that a bubble will burst with certainty at time T, there may exist a bubble at
every trading node before T as long as every period tk, k = 0;1;:::, agent believes that
1Early contributions to this literature include Sargent and Wallace (1973), Blanchard (1979), and
Flood and Garber (1979). For a more recent overview on the vast REE literature on bubbles see, e.g.,
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all period tk+1;tk+2;::: agents believe that they will have a trading opportunity before
the time-horizon T ￿nally arrives. Intuitively, a positive (negative) bubble may therefore
exist in our REE framework because at every trading node the buyer (seller) assumes
that he will be able to re-sell (re-buy) the asset in time. A typical trading sequence
ftn j n = 0;1;:::g supporting such beliefs for a ￿nite time-horizon would be one where
trading becomes faster and faster generating thereby in￿nitely many trading opportu-
nities before ￿closing date￿T.
Key to the existence of bubbles in our model is thus the agents￿conviction in never-
ending trading opportunities rather than an in￿nite time horizon per se. Beyond our
mere technical result, our approach therefore gives rise to a behavioral interpretation
of bubbles in terms of myopic agents who are ￿overcon￿dent￿in the following sense:
Every agent believes in beating the other agents in the sense that he is certain to not
be caught holding the asset when a positive bubble bursts, (to hold the asset when a
negative bubble bursts, respectively).
2. Model
Consider the time set [0;T] such that T 2 R+ [ f1g and ￿x an arbitrary sequence
of time nodes T = ftk 2 [0;T] j k = 0;1;:::g. We interpret the members of T as the
time nodes at which trading between agents may happen. Let ￿ denote the states of
the world. For every time node t 2 T we assume that the period t agents, denoted
it 2 f1;:::;ng, are risk-neutral and share the same prior ￿. Let ￿it denote each period
t agent￿ s private information partition of ￿ and Fit the ￿-algebra generated by ￿it, i.e.
Fit := ￿(￿it). Further, denote by Ft the ￿-algebra generated by the joint (cf. Aumann





That is, ￿t describes the information partition that would result when all period t agents
shared their private information with each other. We thus consider the probability space
(￿;FT;￿) where ￿ is an additive subjective probability measure and the ￿-algebra FT
is generated by the sequence of sub ￿-algebras fFtngn=0;1;::. We further assume that, for
all tk, ￿tk+1 is ￿ner than ￿tk so that fFtkgk=0;1;:: constitutes a ￿ltration.
Let D be a space of R+-valued stochastic processes on [0;T]. We associate with
a given asset the process D 2 D, i.e., D : ￿ ￿ [0;T] ! [0;1) whereby we interpret
D(!;t) as the asset￿ s dividend-payment at time t and state !. We impose that this
process is product measurable. That is, D is measurable with respect to the smallest
sigma-algebra on ￿￿T containing all sets of the form A￿B where A 2 FT and B is in
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the Borel sigma-algebra on [0;T]. We also impose that D is an adapted processes, i.e.,
the random variable Dt is measurable with respect to Ft.
Write ￿k
k+n := tk+n ￿ tk and denote by e
￿￿￿k
k+n 2 (0;1) the agents￿common time
discount factor associated with time interval ￿k
k+n . The time-discounted total dividend
payments of the asset in time interval ￿k






Note that this de￿nition of accumulated dividend-payments in terms of a Lebesgue inte-
gral allows us to incorporate general dividend-payment processes that do not necessarily
have to be continuous almost everywhere as in the case of the Riemann integral.
According to myopic optimizing behavior, period tk equilibrium prices must equal
the expected value of the asset at period tk+1 whereby this expectation is conditional on
the information received in period tk. In an REE every agent￿ s information at period tk
must also include all information revealed by the period tk equilibrium price. In the case
of a fully revealing REE this information revealed at equilibrium prices is common to all
agents and equivalently described by the information partition (1). These￿ somewhat
informal￿ considerations allow us to de￿ne the period t 2 T fundamental value of the
asset for all agents as the following Ft-measurable random variable








e￿￿(￿￿t)D(￿)d￿ j I (t)
!
if t < T
0 if t = T
(3)
whereby the expectation is taken with respect to the subjective conditional probability
measure ￿ (￿ j I(t)) such that I(t) 2 ￿t.2
De￿nitions. Myopic fully-revealing REE; Speculative bubbles
￿ In a myopic fully revealing REE equilibrium prices are given as a R+-valued
stochastic process p : ￿￿T ! [0;1) where every period tk 2 T equilibrium
price function is an Ftk-measurable random variable p(tk) : ￿ ! [0;1) such













e￿￿(￿￿tk)D(￿) j I (t)
￿
d￿
so that the integrand in (3) is measurable with respect to ￿ (￿ j I(t)). Consequently, (3) is well-de￿ned.















if tk < T
0 if tk = T
(4)
with I(tk) 2 ￿tk.
￿ The period t bubble-term is de￿ned as the Ft-measurable random variable
B (t) := p(t) ￿ f (I (t)) (5)
with p(t) given by (4). Whenever B (t)(!) 6= 0 we say that there exists a
speculative bubble at time t in state ! 2 ￿.
By restricting attention to fully revealing REEs we are not losing much generality.
Namely, recall that Radner (1979) shows for a large class of economies that fully revealing
REEs generically exist and, moreover, that any REE is generically fully revealing. While
Radner￿ s proof requires￿ in contrast to our assumption of risk-neutrality￿ strictly risk-
averse agents, our framework of linear utilities also covers Radner economies when we
simply reinterpret ￿ as risk-neutral subject probability measure (cf. Theorem 2 in
Dybvig and Ross 2003).
3. Results
Theorem ￿Discounted martingale property￿ . Fix an arbitrary increasing se-
quence of time nodes T = ftk 2 [0;T] j k = 0;1;:::g. In any myopic fully revealing
REE it must hold that, for all 8k;n 2 N such that tk+n 2 T ,
B (tk) = e
￿￿￿k
k+nE (B (tk+n) j I (tk)). (6)
Proof: Let M denote the ￿-measurable sets. The key fact to note is that since the





is a measure on M. For notational simplicity, we let D denote the function e￿￿(w￿t)D(w).


























As we shall see, this property is key to the proof since, in general, Lebesgue integrals
cannot be added together as easily as Riemann integrals.
Fix some tk 2 T and de￿ne the (half-open) time interval Ai;j as follows
Ai;j := (tk+i;tk+j] for all 8tk+i;tk+j 2 T . (12)
Note that Ai;j 2 M, i.e., each Ai;j is ￿-measurable, since, by construction, all Borels are

















k+1p(tk+1) + ￿(A0;1) j I (tk)
￿
. (14)

















k+mp(tk+m) + ￿(A0;m) j I (tk)
￿
. (16)















k+m+1p(tk+m+1) + ￿(A0;m+1) j I (tk)
￿
(18)
whereby the last step follows because ￿ is an additive measure and Am;m+1 \ A0;m = ;.





k+np(tk+n) + ￿(A0;n) j I (tk)
￿
for all 8n 2 N. (19) 256Economics Bulletin, 2012, Vol. 32 No. 1 pp. 251-259





k+np(tk+n) + ￿(A0;n) j I (tk)
￿
(20)
= E (E (￿(An;1) j I(tk+n)) j I(tk)) (21)
+ e
￿￿￿k
k+nE (B(tk+n) j I(tk)) + E (￿(A0;n) j I(tk)) (22)
= E (￿(A0;1) j I(tk)) + e
￿￿￿k










k+nE (B(tk+n) j I(tk)) (24)




k+nE (B(tk+n) j I(tk)) for all 8k;n 2 N such that tk+n 2 T , (25)
i.e., bubbles are discounted martingales on the time nodes in T . This proves the
theorem.￿￿
Proposition. Fix an arbitrary sequence of time nodes T = ftk 2 [0;T] j k = 0;1;:::g
such that limk!1 tk = T. There may exist a speculative bubble at some time node
t 2 T if and only if maxT does not exist.
Proof. Part (i). Suppose that maxT exists. In that case maxT = T. By (4), the
period T equilibrium price is given as
p(T) = D(T) (26)
so that the period T bubble-term becomes
B (T) = p(T) ￿ f (T) (27)
= D(T) ￿ D(T) (28)
,
B (T)(!) = 0 for 8! 2 ￿. (29)
By the above theorem, for all t 2 T such that t < T,
B (t) = e
￿￿(T￿t)E (B (T) j I (t)) (30)
= e
￿￿(T￿t) ￿ 0 (31)
,
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so that there cannot exist a speculative bubble at any time node t 2 T and in any state
! 2 ￿ when maxT exists.￿
Part (ii). Suppose now that maxT does not exist. By the above theorem,
B (tk) = e
￿￿￿k














k+2E (B (tk+2) j I (tk)) (35)
whereby the last step follows from the law of iterated expectations and our assumption
of an information ￿ltration. Repeating this argument shows that, for any tk 2 T and
any n 2 N,




k+n )E (B (tk+n) j I (tk)) (36)
= e
￿￿￿k
k+nE (B (tk+n) j I (tk)). (37)
Fix now a state ! 2 ￿ such that there exists a speculative bubble at tk, i.e.,
B (tk)(!) = b 6= 0. (38)
Then, for ! 2 I (tk),





￿ b 6= 0. (39)
However, since




0 j I (tk)) (40)
for ! 2 I (tk), there must exist some set A ￿ I (tk) in Ftk+n with ￿ (A j I (tk)) > 0 such
that
B (tk+n)(!
0) 6= 0 for all !
0 2 A. (41)
This proves that whenever there exists a speculative bubble at some tk 2 T , then there
also exists a speculative bubble with positive probability at all time nodes t 2 T such
tk < t. Thus, by simply introducing a state ! 2 ￿ in which a bubble exists at t0, we
construct the possible existence of a bubble at all time-nodes t 2 T whenever maxT
does not exist.￿￿
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